In a military intervention, do surges work? In this talk Dr. Timothy Lomperis, Prof. Emeritus of Political Science at St. Louis University will compare the failed 'surge' in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: 1.) the military dimensions and strategy of the surging external forces, 2.) the military capabilities of the local host forces, 3.) the political vitality and will of the local host country, 4.) the political commitment and will in the domestic politics of the external intervener. I find that the fourth feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the endurance of the American political commitment was lacking. Finally, the  key ingredient to a successful surge is the retention of a potent external  residual military force after the surge runs its course.